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Summary 
The thesis is built around a Non-Governmental Organization in Nicaragua that offers 
micro-credit to its members, and investigates how access to credit affects the 
borrowers. It is an NGO that has a focus on development in rural areas and the thesis 
looks at how micro-credit can be beneficial both for the lender and the borrower in 
this specific context. 
Cipres consists of mainly farmers living in rural Nicaragua, who are organized in 
cooperatives on community level. The cooperatives are again organized under eight 
regional offices. The organization of the members is important in understanding the 
concepts behind the micro-credit, and how problems related to offering credit to poor 
people are met.  
Cipres offers credit both through specific projects and through their own circulating 
fund in every cooperative. The projects are funded by Cipres, the government or 
international NGOs. They support projects of production of Nicaraguan staple foods 
such as beans, maize and rice, other vegetables, coffee, tobacco, animal breeding or 
other types of projects. Through these projects, the member families can receive 
credit to initiate production on their own. The same is for the circulating fund in the 
cooperative, but this fund is much smaller, and covers a smaller range of activities 
and lower lending amounts.  
When asked about the effects of micro-credit on the social development level among 
the members in Cipres, it is obvious that it has had a positive impact. Levels of 
income, predictability of income, quality of housing, amount of production 
equipment, ability of sending children to school, quality of life and access to health 
services have risen for about 74% of the informants. 
Access to basic services has also risen, but the conclusions are more difficult to 
interpret, when taking into account the general development level on the community 
level. 
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When Cipres is offering micro-credit to its members, there are several factors to take 
into account. Moral hazard and adverse selection problems can arise because of 
asymmetric information between the lender and the borrower. It is however shown 
how this can be solved by monitoring among the members in community-based 
cooperatives. There are also problems concerning incentives for repayment and the 
threat of losing clients to other institutions offering micro-credit. A solution that can 
secure for this is by offering progressive lending, that gives incentives both to 
repayment and a long-term commitment of the borrowers. The thesis also covers the 
problem with risk in agricultural production. The farmer meets a wide range of risk 
factors in production, and this must be taken into consideration both by the lending 
institution and the farmer. The farmer can self-insure through product- and income 
diversification, and Cipres can offer flexible repayment contidions to easen the 
economic shock for the farmers in case of for example extreme weather conditions. 
This is shown in a simple model. 
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1. Introduction 
This thesis takes a closer look at a non-governmental organization in Nicaragua that 
offers micro-credit to its members, and investigates how access to credit affects the 
borrowers. 
If a micro-credit contract is made in such a way that it induces a high risk of loss for 
the borrower in the long run, it will neither be a sustainable agreement for the 
borrower, but nor for the lender. The borrower will not want to commit for a longer 
period of time, and the lender will make a contract with strict short run 
considerations, and at the same time risk losing clients. How can a lending institution 
obtain a long-term and fruitful relationship with the borrower without losing 
economically? And how does micro-credit influence sustainable social development 
among credit recipients in rural areas?  
Fieldwork 
The thesis is based on a seven weeks fieldwork in Nicaragua during June and July 
2008. During the stay I worked with a Nicaraguan non-governmental organization 
called Cipres, or Centre for Rural and Social Promotion, Investigation and 
Development1. They work mainly in rural areas, with the aim of improving the level 
of life of their member families, through focusing on higher production, 
commercialization, investigation and development. One of their tools is to offer 
micro-credit to their members.  
During the stay, I got a good impression of the work Cipres is doing, and have chosen 
to use the organization as an example of a micro-credit lending institution. The thesis 
will therefore be built around this organization. I investigate how work with credit 
can be done in a situation where the lender has the same goal as the recipients; 
gaining development, and not economic profit. A necessary condition is however that 
the organization must be economically efficient. 
                                            
1 Centro Para la Promoción, Investigación y el Desarrollo Rural y Social  
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While being there, I worked both with workers at the national office in Managua, 
seven of the eight regional offices, and many of the local cooperatives. This work was 
important in understanding the organization and their routines. However, I spent most 
of my time with the farmers and members of the organization, doing a questionaire 
and talking with them about the micro-credit and how it had affected them.  
Because Cipres has a focus on rural areas, I look at aspects that are specific to small 
and medium-scale farmers living in rural areas in Nicaragua.  
The background for chosing this theme is knowledge of and former stays in 
Nicaragua and Central America, and a keen interest in development and 
microfinance. I have also worked with the youth group of The Development Fund 
Norway (Utviklingsfondet), which has Cipres as one of their main partners in 
Nicaragua. 
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2. Rural Finance and Microfinance 
Rural finance is of crucial importance when treating issues of poverty and 
development in rural areas (The International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(2009) and The World Bank (2008)). The World Bank emphasizes the need for 
finance in order to achieve economic growth, inclusion and participation of all 
members of the rural population in economic development, as well as reduction of 
vulnerability to economic, physical and other shocks to the production. The reason is 
that credit is a necessary tool for both households and enterprices to be able to gain 
productivity growth and generate more income in the future. 
2.1 Microfinance 
Microfinance became worldly recognized as “banking for the poor” when 
Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank recieved The Nobel Peace Prize for their 
work with micro-credit in 2006. Credit unions and cooperatives around the world 
have however worked with microfinance for many decades. In literature it became a 
concept in the 1970s, when organizations and banks began developing a framework 
for working with finance for the less developed population (Robinson 2001:52). 
Jonathan Murdoch (1999) defines microfinance as institutions 
”(…) serving clients that have been excluded from the formal banking 
sector”, 
while The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, CGAP (2009), defines it on their 
homepage, as  
”Microfinance offers poor people access to basic financial services 
such as loans, savings, money transfer services and microinsurance”  
Microfinance is the broader definition of all financial services, while micro-credit 
includes only the lending aspect. This thesis will focus on micro-credit.  
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The recipients of micro-credit are small and medium-sized farmers or entrepreneurs. 
The lending amounts are often much lower than in the traditional banking sector, and 
this together with the often unsecure financial situation of the borrowers, makes 
micro-credit different from traditional credit. The loans are often associated with 
greater risk of repayment, because of low income levels among the borrowers, none 
or low collateral requirements, as well as asymmetric information concerning the 
production and economic situation of the borrower. Poor people also often lack of 
sufficient education and/or reading and writing skills, which require a closer follow-
up from the lending institution.  
To offer poor people credit, it also requires a lending strategy that is specific to 
coping with problems related to this. It is done in a number of ways, and each micro-
credit institution works differently. Group lending is however one of the innovations 
of microfinance that has received most attention (eg. Stiglitz (1990) and Chatterjee 
and Sarangi (2004)). It includes mutual control and risk sharing among neighbours in 
small credit groups. Another common innovation is dynamic incentives/ progressive 
lending, where the credit amount increases with the number of successful 
repayments. Yet another is to offer the borrowers flexible repayment schedules 
(Morduch 1999). 
Microfinance can be offered both by governments, private financiers and banks, as 
well as Non- Governmental Organizations. For practiotioners on the right political 
side, such as many private institutions, it is a way of achieving poverty reduction 
while gaining profit, and for left-side practitioners, it can be a way of enhancing local 
development (ibid). 
2.2 Rural Finance in Nicaragua 
Nicaragua is the second poorest country in Latin America and lies in Central 
America, between Costa Rica in the south and Honduras in the north. The country has 
an economy based on agricultural production, and a population where close to 43% 
live in rural areas (Rural Poverty Portal 2009).  
 11 
2.2.1 Credit and Politics 
Nicaragua has a turbulent recent history, with the Sandinista revolution marking an 
important year in 1979. The Sandinista revolution was a social revolution led by 
peasants and people living in rural areas. It gave rise to political unrest and a civil war 
in the 1980s, before the opposition formed a new party, the Nacional Opposition 
Union-UNO2, and won the elections in 1990. In 2006 Daniel Ortega, one of the main 
figures of the Sandinista revolution, was elected President for the Frente Sandinista 
Liberación Nacional (FSLN). The type of government in Nicaragua has had an 
important influence on the level of credit and financial services given to the rural 
population. 
In 1978, 4% of peasants received credit ment for agricultural purposes, while in 1985 
the number was 31%. Following the Sandanista revolution, the banking system was 
nationalized, and there was an enhanced focus on giving credit to small and medium 
sized farmers. This was the first time they had been given access to credit. During the 
mid-1980s, however, Nicaragua experienced economic recession. It was partly 
because the banks charged too low interest rates on producer loans, to keep up with 
the high inflation rate. Because of this, the banks were unable to repay their own 
loans, and this contributed to hyperinflation at the end of the 1980s. Following this 
the non-traditional credit markets experienced growth in Nicaragua in the 1990s. 
Their aim was the less developed part of the population, in contradiction to state and 
private run commercial banks (Jonakin J. and L. Enriquez 1999). 
Nicaragua became dependent on loans from The World Bank and The Interntational 
Monetary Fund in the 1980s. Because of structural adjustment plans following these 
loans, the country led a more market-based strategy. This also affected the banking 
sector and the former state-led credit institutions, which now became privatized 
again, but this time under the supervision of central authorities (La 
Superintendencia). It resulted in higher collateral requirements, and fewer peasants 
                                            
2 Unión Nacional Opositora- UNO 
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receiving credit. Over the period 1991/92 to 1997/98 the total amount of credit given 
by the National Development Bank (BANADES), dropped by 50% in nominal terms 
(Jonakin J. and L. Enriquez 1999). 
2.2.2 Microfinance in Nicaragua 
There has been a rapid increase in microfinance clients in Nicaragua over the last 
decade. In 2005 there were around 300 microfinance institutions in Nicaragua. There 
were two regulated finance companies, seven private unregulated corporations, one 
hundred non-governmental organizations and one hundre and ninety cooperatives. 
The growth over the last decade has been substantial. As Figure 2-2 shows, there was 
an average annual growth of 26% between 1999 and 2004(CGAP 2005).  
 
Figure 2-2 Growth of number of credit clients in Nicaragua from 1999-2004. 
There are several associations of microfinance institutions (MFI`s) in Nicaragua. 
They work with coordination of member organizations, publishing relevant data, 
political influence and arranging training. The largest association for NGOs is the 
Nicaraguan Association of Microfinance Institutions, ASOMIF3, where twenty-two 
of the hundred NGOs are members. Cipres is however not a member of any 
microfinance association. 
                                            
3 Asociación Nicaragüense de Institutciones de Microfinanzas 
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In 2002 the non-profit and non-commercialized credit institutions had a market share 
of 74% of all the microfinance loans in Nicaragua. This signifies the largest 
percentage share in Latin America (Lanuza 2004). 
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3. Cipres as an Institution 
Cipres was founded in 1990 and has now got 43 employees. The organization works 
with development, hunger and poverty related issues in rural areas as well as 
investigation on agricultural subjects.  
Cipres had 3049 member families by July 2008, and all members must belong to a 
cooperative. The members are of all types of professions, but most live in rural areas 
or small towns, and work with agriculture, livestock or both. There is one member 
per family, and there are both men and woman participating. It is part of Cipres` 
politics, to include women on all levels of the organization. The gender distribution is 
54% males and 46% women (Fecodesa 2008), and the education level stretches from 
illiterates without any schooling, to University graduates. 
The organization collaborates with various Nicaraguan Universities in agricultural 
investigation projects. In 2008 they were working on a project of crossing plants to 
make them more resitant to extreme weather and plant desease, and projects on 
biodigestion and water cleaning. 
In December 2007 Fecodesa, Federation of Cooperatives for Development4 was 
founded, and Cipres as an organization became only a part of the federation. The 
thesis will focus on Cipres as the organization it has been, because by July 2008 the 
change had only been implemented to a very small extent. 
The organization is politically independent, but it is built on socialist principles. 
                                            
4Cipres changed in December 2007 its status from being an organization, to becoming an NGO within a federation, 
Federación de Cooperativas para el Desarrollo, Fecodesa. Before the recent government with Daniel Ortega/Frente 
Sandinista Liberación Nacional, an NGO could not be part of an institution. This has now changed, and Cipres was 
therefore able to form Fecodesa. The funding of Fecodesa had been a long term goal for Cipres, because as a federation, it 
stands stronger in political issues and influence. The organization, Cipres, will persist, but gradually become a smaller part 
of the federation over time. 
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3.1 The Organizational Structure 
Cipres is organized as an umbrella, and the centre of administration or national office, 
is situated in Managua. The level below the national office consists of the regional 
offices, or what they call a Central/Unión. Each regional office consists of five or 
more cooperatives. The cooperatives constitute of member families living in rural 
areas. I will not go further into what Cipres does at the national office, because they 
only have a coordinating role. 
Below is an organizational chart, showing how the different levels are linked 
together. The rest of this chapter explains each level more thoroughly.  
 
Figure 3-1: Organizational structure 
3.2 Regional Offices: Centrals/Unions 
There are eight regional offices in Cipres. They are mainly situated in the North-
Western part of Nicaragua, exept for one that covers the area of the Departamento de 
Rio San Juan, close to the Costa Rican border in the south. See Figure 4-2 below. 
Each Central/Unión must consist of at least five cooperatives, and are of varying 
sizes. Unión de Cooperativas Departamental de Río San Juan is the best-developed 
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regional office, with 639 members and 25 cooperatives. The smallest is Unión de 
Cooperativas de Peñas Blancas, with 127 members. 
Each central/union has a coordinating role of the belonging cooperatives, and when 
cooperatives apply for funding of projects, the applications are first sent for 
revisitation by the central/union. If several cooperatives apply for the same type of 
funding, the applications will be put together and sent as a common application. The 
central/union is also from where most of the members recieve credit.  
Most centrals/unions have their own office and/or a farm, where employees or 
members of the cooperatives work. In some centrals/unions they also offer their 
members to work instead of paying the entrance fee when becoming a member.  
There is a difference between a central and a union. The central is a regional office 
that constitutes of cooperatives that produce the same type of products, for example 
only staple foods or livestock and other animal breeding. A union is a regional office 
that consists of cooperatives with members of several professions and product 
varieties. 
 
Figure 4-2: Map of Nicaraguan political departments. 
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Estelí region/ Pueblo Nuevo: 
Central de Cooperativas de Pueblo Nuevo (CECOOP) 
In this region the main areas of production are beans, maize and chicken. The central 
has 290 members and a well-run office with five employees. They also have a farm 
with five employees (not members of Cipres). The central and the farm also often 
host students, who work there as part of their practical training. On the farm, the 
employees, the students and some from the cooperatives work with a seed 
improvement project, production of certified seeds and ecological fertilizers and 
animal breeding. It is a well-known central among farmers in the area, and from the 
office in Pueblo Nuevo they sell the chicken, seeds and fertilizers to farmers. In June-
July 2008 they sold it at a price below market price, because of unusual high world 
market food prices (International Monetary Fund 2009).  
Matriz region/Palacagüina:  
Central de Cooperativas Multisectoral de Palacagüina (COOPAL)  
The central works closely with Central de Cooperativas de Pueblo Nuevo (ten 
minutes away), and also has a farm where they produce and sell vegetables and 
chicken. The central has three employees and several members working there. The 
number of members in the central is 291. 
Matagalpa region/Tuma-La Dalia: Unión de Cooperativas de Peñas 
Blancas (UCOPB) and 
Jinotega region/Jigüina: Unión de Cooperativas de Jinotega (JIGÜINA)  
These two unions share the same office in Matagalpa. There are two employees and 
the unions have a total of 376 members. The members mainly produce beans and 
maize and some other vegetables. They also have cooperatives that export coffee and 
malanga (a potato-like vegetable). The region has experienced a growth in agriculture 
over the last few years because of climate changes, and now has nine months of rain 
every year as well as three harvests annually.  
Estelí region/Condega:  
Unión de Cooperativas de Las Segovias (UCOSE) 
The union was founded in April 2008, and was still in the process of getting their 
judicial papers in order in July 2008. When this is done, they will be one of the 
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largest centrals/unions with 305 members. The cooperatives that form this union have 
exported coffee for many years and have business agreements with several local 
agents. They produce and sell tobacco to a local factory, and they also have 
arrangements with the supermarket in Estelí, which sells their coffee. They have 
equipment that enables them to do the whole coffee processing work them selves.  
Chinandega region/Somotillo:  
Central de Cooperativas de Mujeres de Somotillo (CECOMUSO) 
The central consists of 286 women and one man, and lies in the dry region of the 
North- West, close to the Honduran border. The region suffers from an unfriendly 
climate and experiences the effects of the climate changes with severe draught 
combined with random hurricanes and huge amounts of rain. The soil is not nutritious 
enough to absorbe large amounts of rains, which makes the situation difficult for the 
farmers. Consequently, this is one of the poorest regions in the country (Rural 
Poverty Portal 2009). The members mainly produce what they consume, and have a 
production focused on beans, maize and other basic foods. 
The cooperative has one employee, and they have a farm where they produce and sell 
cashew nuts and chicken. 
Río San Juan region/San Carlos:  
Unión Departamental de Cooperativas de Río San Juan (COOPERIO) 
This union is the best-developed union in Cipres, and they cover a large area in the 
tropical region of the South. Among the population in the region, they are known as 
COOPERIO, and not Cipres. The union has a regional office with eight employees in 
San Carlos, and a local office in Boca de Sábalos with two employees.  
As mentioned above, this union constitutes of 25 cooperatives and 639 members. The 
cooperatives work within a large variety of sectors; agriculture (beans, maize, 
oranges, cocoa, rice), livestock, tourism, transport (a cooperative of taxi drivers), 
commerce (small shops), palm tree oil etc. This is the union that has the longest 
experience in working with micro-credit. 
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León region/León: Central de Cooperativas Manos Unidas (CECOMUN) 
This central has 861 members and is the largest central in Cipres. It was not visited 
during the field work. 
3.3 Cooperatives 
Cipres consist of 112 cooperatives of varying sizes, and each cooperative must 
consist of at least five members. The members need to have a base in the same local 
community, and work within the same area of production. Often farmers produce 
more than one good, but within the cooperative they have a focus on one or a few 
products. There are also womens cooperatives and cooperatives for certain types of 
professions, eg. tourism or transportation.  
Reaching the market with their products is a large problem among rural farmers in 
Nicaragua. By organizing themselves in cooperatives it is easier to gain market 
access, because it enables them to focus production on a few products and sell them 
together through the cooperative.  
The cooperatives are very different from each other, and trying to explain how they 
work can be confusing as there are few common principles. For the sake of easier 
understanding, they are here divided into categories; exporting cooperatives, local 
market cooperatives and project-oriented cooperatives. 
Exporting Cooperatives 
The cooperatives that export their products to foreign countries are the most 
professional ones. For example do some cooperatives in the Matagalpa and Rio San 
Juan regions export malanga to Costa Rica. In Rio San Juan there is also a 
cooperative that produces palm trees and sells the berries to an Austrian company that 
does the processing work of making palm tree oil. Other examples of exported 
products are coffee and tobacco to the United States and Spain. 
Each farmer sells his production to the cooperative at the current market price. The 
cooperative has agreements with another company, who buys from the cooperative as 
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a whole. By doing it this way, the farmers get access to a market they otherwise 
would not have been able to reach. If the cooperatives are able to do the processing 
work them selves, it raises the value of the sales substantially. An example is 
Cooperativa Multisectoral Nueva Esperanza in the region of Estelí/las Segovias (Mid-
North), which produces coffee. It is one of the largest and most experienced 
cooperatives in Cipres, and they process their coffee within the cooperative before 
they sell it.  
Local Market Cooperatives 
These cooperatives sell their products jointly on the local market. It can be the 
vegetable market in the closest town or city, or they might have an arrangement with 
the local supermarket to sell their products. Many cooperatives work in this way. An 
example is Cooperativa Juan Carlos Morales in the La Dalia/Matagalpa region. They 
produce staple foods, and sell it on the local market in La Dalia. 
Project-oriented Cooperatives 
These cooperatives work with production that they have started after recieving 
funding for a project. The projects are specified through the central/union, and they 
apply for funding from either official sources or other instances. An example is that 
some farmers produce certified seeds. The seeds are either sold on the market or 
through the cooperative to a fair price for the farmers. Another example is a womens` 
cooperative that is initiating production of natural medicin. The women would not 
have been able to work with this without being organized in the cooperative. The fact 
that they are all part of the same community, gives a snowball effect in the sence that 
more and more women want to participate in the cooperative because they see their 
neighbour who is ”just the same as them”, joining. These women have found a 
demand for the products in the local community, and by organizing themselves in this 
way, it gives many women the opportunity of getting an additional income outside 
their traditional farm work. 
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Another example is where farmers or other groups of professionals, such as within 
tourism or transport, gather in cooperatives because it enables them to apply for 
funding together as a group.  
3.4 Member/ Farmer 
3.4.1 Membership in Cipres 
To be able to become a member, one need to apply formally, stating basic 
information about the household. Usually there is an admission fee. How large the fee 
is, depends on the cooperative. Some charge a higher sum to become a member and 
no annual fee, while some charge a small fee every year. Some have a payment 
arrangement where you pay as much as you are capable of according to your income, 
and in some cooperatives the members can participate in the daily work of running 
the cooperative instead of paying. The admission fee from all the members is invested 
in the Fondo Revolvente, or the Circulating Fund of the cooperative.  
Being a member in Cipres requires active participation in the organization. It is not an 
organization that is solely based on micro-credit, but it works with a wide range of 
activities within agriculture. The members can to some degree chose how active they 
are, but are expected to participate in the work of the cooperative.  
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4.  Agricultural Production and Income Among 
Farmers in Cipres 
4.1 Agricultural Production 
Granos basicos is the staple food in Nicaragua, and includes beans, maize, sorghum 
and rice. In rural areas granos basicos is also often the only food, because of low 
prices and easy storage. A large part of Nicaraguan peasants have these goods as their 
main area of production and income (Jonakin J. and L. Enríquez 1999), and they are 
also important export commodities. Some peasants have differentiated their 
production and hold other varieties in addition, but most produce at least enough 
granos basicos to cover their own consumption.  
Other important varieties in agricultural production are tomatoes, chile, oranges, 
cocoa, palm tree berries (used in production of palm tree oil and biofuels), grapes, 
malanga and yuca (similar to potato). Which ones are suitable to produce depend on 
the region and the climate, the altitude and the soil in the area. What signifies these 
products is that they pay more when sold than the granos basicos, but they cannot be 
stored over longer periods of time. Many cooperatives in Cipres work with export of 
such goods. 
Nicaragua is one of the largest coffee producers in the world. The main area of coffee 
production is the Mid-North (Matagalpa, Estelí and Jinotega). Because of a high 
altitude and long periods of rain every year, the climate is particularly suited for 
coffee production. Coffee pays more than granos basicos, and some cooperatives 
export coffee to Spain and the United States, branded fair trade and ecologically 
produced.  
Some regions where Cipres have regional offices (Estelí and Matriz) are particularly 
suited for production of tobacco. The farmers produce tobacco leaves, and sell them 
through the cooperatives to a local factory that produce ecologically branded cigars 
for export. Cigars are also one of the largest exporting sectors of the country (Food 
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and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2009), and the country is known 
worldwide for the high quality. 
In addition to agricultural products, many farmers breed animals, such as cows, pigs 
and chicken. Cows are useful in many ways and are considered to be a good 
investment. They can be used in agriculture, as food, in producing dairy products and 
are often used as a way of saving. Pigs and chicken are used for eating, and chicken is 
also kept because of the eggs. 
4.2 Income and Planning 
For the farmers in Cipres, the income is only generated a few periods during the year, 
and many do not have an income between the harvests. This means that when they 
estimate their income, it will often be done on a year-to-year basis. Especially in the 
Northern regions, June and July is considered to be the most difficult months of the 
year. The period between the harvests is longer, and they must therefore spread the 
income from the last crop over a longer period of time.  
In general the number of harvests per year is two, but it varies with the climate. Some 
areas have one harvest, which is considered to be little and some have three, which is 
considered to be very good. In some areas the climate has changed over the last 
decade, and this has had an effect on the number of harvests. The hurricane Mitch in 
1998 affected many farmers in Nicaragua, and made damages to the soil quality in 
the Pueblo Nuevo region that still affects the production level of many farms. Many 
farmers living close to the river had to move because of flooding, and now cultivate 
on less nutritious land than what they did before the hurricane. In the Chinandega 
region, many farmers also still struggle with the devastations made by hurricane Felix 
in 2007.  
After every harvest, they need to decide what to do with the crop. They must consider 
what will be their level of consumption the coming months until the next harvest, and 
then decide how much to sell and how much to keep. In addition, they would want to 
save a fraction in case of sudden costs, like medical expences, housing materials etc.  
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Investments are primarily based on short run considerations, because of the low level 
of income. Many live on subsistence level, which means that they cannot afford to 
lose in one period to be able to gain in the next period. The loans they recieve from 
Cipres cover costs of good quality seeds, fertilizers and other costs that needs to be 
done in order to get a good harvest. There is a big difference in the size of the crop 
with and without these initial investments. 
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5. Organization of Credit Schemes in Cipres 
Cipres works with offering credit to their members in two different ways; either 
through projects or through the cooperatives. In the central/union they have a fund for 
the projects, and in the cooperatives they have a circulating fund.  
5.1 Project Funding  
The fund in the central/union is the largest fund, and mainly consists of money from 
external credit donors. The largest credit donor is the Fund for Rural Credit5, which is 
part of the government and works solely with rural credit. It has grown in size with 
the recent FSLN government, and mainly offers credit to agricultural and livestock 
projects. The centrals/unions also receive credit from other branches of the 
government, such as the Nicaraguan Institution for Investments6 and the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry7. The Venezuelan Bank of Economic and Social 
Development/BANDES8 gives credit to projects with livestock and animal breeding, 
and the Development Fund Norway9 also supports specific projects. One of the main 
reasons for Cipres to organize themselves like they do is to make it is easier to gather 
groups of farmers who can participate in the projects and apply for funding.  
When the centrals/unions receive credit from these institutions, they are charged a 
low interest rate. The Fund for Rural Credit has an interest rate of 5% or 9% yearly 
(depending on the type of project), and BANDES has a 9% interest rate. The 
centrals/unions set an interest rate a little higher than this when they give the loans to 
the farmers.  
                                            
5 Fondo de Credito Rural 
6 Financiera Nicaragüense de Inversion  
7 Ministrerio Agropecuario y Forestal 
8 Banco de Dessarrollo Economico y Social de Venezuela 
9 Utviklingsfondet 
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As an example one can assume that Fund for Rural Credit gives a loan to a 
central/union based on the project application they have recieved. They set an interest 
rate and a repayment plan depending on what type of project it is. Agricultural loans 
give a low interest rate and a repayment schedule of just a few months. This is 
because the loans are given ahead of every season, and the scheduled repayment date 
is when the harvest is over. Loans to cattle and animals are usually higher, and have a 
longer repayment time than agricultural loans. This is due to a longer time span 
associated with breeding animals compared to crop harvesting. The central/union sets 
a higher interest rate than the Fund for Rural Credit, to cover the administrative costs, 
and the costs of running the central/union. They also set a smaller repayment time, 
because it takes some time before and after receiving the credit, to hand it over to the 
farmers and receiving it back. Figure 5-1 shows the steps:  
 
           
 
 
    
 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Project interest rate and repayment period, 
 using Fund for Rural Credit as an example. 
Fund for Rural Credit 
   Central/ Unión 
Farmer 
Interest rate and repayment period 
set by Cipres: 
12 % interest rate,  
5 months repayment 
Interest rate and repayment period 
set by Fund for Rural Credit: 
9 % interest rate,  
7 months repayment 
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5.2 Circulating Fund  
The fund in the cooperative is usually what they call a Fondo Revolvente or a 
Circulating Fund. All cooperatives have such a fund. This fund is much smaller in 
economic size than the projects, and forms a part of the economy of the cooperative. 
The fund is in some cooperatives used to give small loans to the farmers/members of 
the cooperative, and can also be used to invest in the cooperative itself, for example 
by buying production equipment or animals. One example is where the cooperative 
buys a calf. It gives the calf to one of the farmers, who have to give a calf back to the 
cooperative when it has grown big and fertile. When the cooperative receives the new 
calf, the farmer keeps the cow and a new farmer will get the calf with the same 
obligation of giving one back. This continues until everyone has received a cow. 
Then the cooperative sells the last one, and places the money back into the fund. 
They will then have increased their income, because the cost of buying a calf is lower 
than what they get from selling a fully-grown cow.  
The Circulating Fund gets money from several sources, which differ from every 
cooperative. In general the fund is built on the entrance fee of the members when they 
become part of a cooperative, private contributions (in at least one cooperative you 
can only borrow seven times as much as the value of your contribution), financial 
support from Cipres and profit from sales from the cooperative.   
The Circulating Fund can also give small credit loans to their members, but not all 
cooperatives have this arrangement. 
5.3 The Process 
To be able to apply for a loan you need to be a citizen of Nicaragua and be in 
possession of an ID card with a national insurance number. Additional requirements 
that depend on the cooperative, are that the loans must go to agricultural purposes, 
that you must be a member of a cooperative (a few centrals/unions give loans to non-
members, but this is generally not the case), the loans must be investments in 
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something that gives a future income and/or that you must own the land where you 
produce. 
The farmer applies for a loan, based on how much land he has or how much income 
he assumes to get from investing the money. Cipres has a standard for calculating 
how much crop a certain amount of land will give. The standard is 6000 C$10 per 
manzana11 for beans and 4000 C$ per manzana for maize. To calculate how much 
they can receive, in some cooperatives the loans can get translated into the value of 
beans and maize, if the loans are for other purposes than this. 
When the application form is filled out, they give it to the cooperative. A committee, 
consisting of the president and the vice precident of the cooperative, the treasurer and 
the secretary decides whether the applicant is accepted or not. If the applicant is 
accepted and it is a loan to the Circulating Fund, the application stays here. If it is a 
loan to a project, the application will be sent to the central/union. The reason why this 
decision is made in the cooperative is that they often know the applicant, and can give 
a better assessment of the application and the person who applies. Especially in small 
communities, the cooperatives know who are trustworthy and not.  
When the loans arrive at the central/union, the rest of the work is done there. Before 
the applicants can receive the loan, there will be someone from the central/union that 
pays them a visit where they live, to assure that what they write in the application is 
correct. He then cheks the information on the amount of land, type of production and 
if the address is correct. The loans are given out within eight days of the application, 
which is a short period of time compared to other lending institutions. This is also 
mentioned among the interview objects as one of the most important favourable sides 
of lending in Cipres. 
                                            
10  The exchange rate varied around 1 US$ = 20 C$ (Nicaraguan Cordobas) = 5 NOK during June-July 2008. 
11 One manzana is approximately equal to three hectars of land. 
 29 
The applicant must go to the central/union to recieve the loan, which is given out as a 
check that they must bring to the bank. At the office of the central/union is also where 
they go to make their repayments. Some loans have repayment schedule where they 
pay a little every month, and some pays everything at the end of the period. If they 
pay ahead of time they get a smaller interest rate, based on how many days early they 
are.  
5.4 Collateral 
In general they need collateral that is worth two times the value of the loan, 2:1. If 
they are registered as not having repayed on time earlier, they might need to have 
larger collateral, for example 3:1 or 4:1.  
There are variations in what will be accepted as collateral. Some centrals/unions only 
accept land, either their own or of a family member/neighbour that gives her land as 
collateral for you. Some accept anything that Cipres can have an interest in, such as 
land, agricultural equipment or animals, while another accept the value of your crop 
as collateral. In some cooperatives you have your contribution to the cooperative 
when becoming a member as collateral, while in others anything that has a value 
when sold, like television, electrical equipment or other valuables are accepted. 
5.5 Non-Compliance and Consequences 
In general, Cipres do not have problems with non-compliance of the loans. In this 
survey, 99.68% of all the loans had been repayed. From February to April 2008, 
Unión Departamental de Cooperativas de Rio San Juan had an average of 2.92% 
outstanding loans12. Even though non-compliance is not considered to be a large 
problem in Cipres, they have routines for what will happen if somebody is unable to 
repay their loans. 
                                            
12 See Attachment I 
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First the farmer will be called in to a meeting with representatives from the 
central/union and the cooperative. There they get a chance to explain themselves, and 
the background for their lack of payment. Weather conditions (hurricane, draught, 
heavy rains), plant desease or other unanticipated factors can be reasons for a smaller 
crop than what had been suggested, and thereby also a lower income. Together the 
loan recipient and the representatives then make a new repayment plan. The interest 
rate will increase, often at a growing rate according to how long it takes before they 
pay it back. In Union Departamental de Cooperativas de Rio San Juan, they also have 
a penalty payment of 5% of the total loan. 
If the person does not show up to the meeting, or do not pay according to the renewed 
schedule, it becomes a judicial matter. If this happends, their collateral can end up 
being taken. 
One special case is the Central de Cooperativas de Peñas Blancas: Here they hardly 
have any problems of repayment, even though they do not have very strict rules for 
this. If a person cannot repay the loan after the harvest, he gets the opportunity of 
paying it back after the next harvest. This central is the smallest in size of all the 
centrals/unions, and the members have the advantage of knowing each other very 
well. They see each other on a daily basis, so noone can lie or hide the truth. They 
also have a smaller economy than many other centrals/unions, and can only give 
small loans, between 2000 C$- 6000 C$. Other centrals/unions that do not know each 
member that well have stricter rules.  
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6. Credit and Local Social Development 
6.1 Method of research 
The method of research was a questionaire13. The questions were asked orally, both 
because I wanted to make sure that they understood the questions, but also because 
many do not have proper reading and writing skills. I also wanted them to feel free to 
tell me their stories.  
The questionaire was made to get an impression of their economical situation, their 
thoughts around economic issues, and to get as much information as possible about 
their experience with recieving credit from Cipres.    
I experienced that many of them are not used to the same way of thinking as we are. 
Some had difficulties in answering some of the questions, and I also experienced that 
some changed what they told me during the conversation. As a consequence, some of 
the questions will not be treated in the thesis, because I cannot be sure that they 
properly understood the questions. A few questions where added or modified after the 
first few interviews, to improve the fit of the questions.  
When chosing a questionaire as a method of research, I was aware of the limitations 
this would give. I could not include their stories or their thoughts. It also gave 
limitations as to find out more about the scope of their experience with credit. The 
questions are made to find out whether marginal change in their lives had occured, 
not how large the change had been, if there had been any.  
Another limitation is that I only talked to members of Cipres (exept for four people 
that had recieved credit from a cooperative in Cipres, even though they were not 
members). Ideally I would have talked to equal amounts of members and non-
members in every area, and compared them with each other. It was, however, 
                                            
13 See Attachment II 
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difficult just to encounter enough members from Cipres. In rural areas they live 
within large distances, and many of the members I was not able to visit where they 
lived, because they often do not have house specific addresses and the public 
transport in many rural areas is poor.   
Most of the members I met at the offices of the central/union or cooperatives, when 
they where making a loan application or a repayment. I also visited many centrals/ 
unions with German Jímenez, a consultant for Cipres, who was doing work where he 
gathered many of the members in meetings. Then I was able to do the questionaire at 
the same time.  
I also want to add that lingual difficulties might have influenced my understanding on 
some answers, as I am not perfectly fluent in Spanish and I did not have a translator. 
If I was unsure, however, I asked the questions several times and asked them to 
explain what they ment in another way. 
6.2 The informants 
The informants were selected on the background of accessibility and willingness to 
participate, and with the aim of getting a representative selection of gender, age and 
type of production. 
Of the selection of interview objects, 70.3% worked within agriculture and 39% with 
livestock or other types of animal breeding. 26% had other types of employment. 
The gender distribution was 43% females and 57% males. They lived in households 
with an average size of 5.7 people, and with an average of 4.6 children. This does not 
meen that there were many household with only one parent, but rather that some 
households had up to 13 children. Often the household included more relatives than 
just the family as well, as it is normal for aunts, uncles and grandparents to live 
together in the same house. 
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The informants had received credit between one and twenty times from Cipres, but 
with an average of 4.42 loans per household. The loans had an average monthly 
interest rate of 1.9%.  
6.3 Social Development Indicators 
Social development indicators are chosen to include factors that are needed for long-
term social development, and that give a good indication on whether the general 
situation has become better or not. These factors are; the income level (based on short 
run considerations up to one year), predictability of income, the savings rate, ability 
of sending their children to school, the quality of housing, amount of equipment in 
production and quality of life. I also looked at access to basic services, and this is 
treated separately in chapter 6.4. The informants were asked to compare their 
situation before and after recieving credit from Cipres, and Table 6-3 gives a 
summary: 
Variable               Better/higher The same Worse/lower N 
Income level 62.2 21.6 8.1 37 
Predictability of income 73.3 20 6.67 30 
Savings rate 84.4 6.25 9.37 32 
Ability of sending children to 
school 82.1 17.9 0 28 
Level of health care 78.4 18.9 2.7 37 
Quality of housing 64.9 29.7 5.4 37 
Amount of equipment in 
production 69.7 30.3 0 33 
Quality of life 75.7 24.3 0 37 
Average 73.8 21.1 4.03  
 
Table 6-3: Social development factors influenced by micro-credit 
Income and production factors 
The income level among 62.2% of the informants is higher after receiving credit. 
21.6% has an unchanged income level, and 8.1% have a lower income than before. If 
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we compare the income level with the predictability of income, we see that the 
predictability of income has become better for 73.3% of the informants. That means 
that for 11.1% of the informants, the predictability has become better without the 
income becoming higher. This can be understood as a better consumption smoothing 
and a more stable production and consumption pattern.  
On a question concerning expectations of future income, 94.4% say that they expect 
their income in the future to become higher than what it is today. When looking at the 
correlation level between those who have experienced a positive trend in their income 
level, and those who have positive expectations for their future income, the 
correlation level is 0.32. That is a lower correlation than what would normally be 
expected, and shows that many have a positive view on their future income even 
though they are experiencing a negative trend now. What is the reason for this is 
difficult to say.  
When asked about whether their income covers their necessities, the correlation with 
the income level is 0.21. This tells us that it is not always rationality and their actual 
income level that decides their opinion about their own situation. It opens for 
individual differences and subjective considerations about their own situation. Some 
of the informants could say that they had all they needed because they did not go 
hungry all the time, while other would say that they could have been better off with 
more production equipment, and therefore did not have an income that covered their 
necessities.   
When it comes to the production equipment, almost 70% have a higher level, and 
30% have the same level as before. None of the informants owned a tractor or other 
large mechanical production equipments before receiving credit, while two owned at 
least one large production equipment, after receiving credit. The increase in 
production equipments are hence of the smaller sized ones. Many cooperatives do 
however offer their members to lend a tractor, so in this manner several have gotten 
access to a tractor without actually owning it. 
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Saving 
In Cipres, 87.5% of the informants save. At the same time, 84.4% say that their 
savings rate have been raised after recieving loans. This is an important aspect when 
considering sustainable development.  
The fact that a person saves does however not necessarily imply development. There 
could be a constant level of average savings over a specified period of time, but it 
does not necessarily mean an increasing level. Let us assume that we have three 
different trends of the savings rate over time. The first is a situation where the savings 
rate was low in the beginning, but rising over time. The second is where the saving 
rate was high in the beginning, and gradually becoming lower over time. The third is 
a situation where the savings rate varies year by year, and where the average level is 
non- increasing. It is only in the first situation that we will experience development 
(Sato and Samreth 2008). This coincides with the fact that the levels of savings have 
risen for almost 85% after recieving credit from Cipres. 
Social factors 
82.1% say that their ability of sending children to school has become better after 
receiving loans. For 17.9% it has had no effect, while none say that it has become 
worse. Schooling is considered an expense in Nicaragua, because the children need to 
have uniforms at primary school (and some secundary schools), good shoes and 
books. For poor families with many children, this can be very costly. The ability of 
sending children to school is hence directly linked to the income level of the 
household.  
When asked about the level of access to health care, 75.7% of the informants have 
good access, while 21.6% have got access sometimes, and 2.7% have never got 
access to health care. It is apparent that for almost 80% of them, the level of health 
care has risen after receiving credit. That is a substantial increase.  
Among the informants, there is a relatively high number who owns their own land or 
house in a country that has a long history of problems related to landlessness of 
peasants. Before the loans, 78.4% owned their own land/house, and the percentage 
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level rose to 97.3% after receiving credit. By finding the t-values, one can consider 
whether the change is statistically significant or not. To do this, one needs to assume 
a normal distribution of the possible answers concerning land/house ownership before 
and after receiving loans. To be significant on the 95% level, the t-value must be 
larger than 1.96, and for the 99% level, it must be above 2.58. The larger the t-value 
is, the stronger is the result. For the case of ownership of land/house, the t-value is 
2.898. That means that the change is statistically significant both at the 95% and 99% 
significance level.  
The quality of housing has also increased for 64.9%, while for almost 30% it has not 
changed. This can however also be influenced by how the household prioritize their 
income. For some, they might have a house that is basic, but in good shape, while 
others might have had very bad housing conditions before, and chose to improve this 
when receiving credit.  
Quality of life with receiving credit has also increased for over 75% of the 
informants. Quality of life was not defined for the informants, so they could interpret 
it in their own way. This is because quality of life does not have a proper definiton, 
and is individually understood.  
An aspect that does not seem to have been influenced by the credit is membership in 
social or political organizations. Only 16.2 % says that they have become members of 
at least one new social or political organization after recieving credit.  
General conclusion 
From Table 6-3 we can see that on average 73.8% consider their situation to be better 
after recieving micro-credit. We also see that 21.1% consider their situation to be the 
same as before they received credit, while only an average of 4.03% are experiencing 
a decline in their situation. It is therefore a natural conclusion to state that the micro-
credit has had a positive impact on the social development level among the members 
of Cipres. 
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6.4 Basic Services 
Access to basic services is also a factor of importance for local development. The 
reason for looking at both the household and the community level is to try to correct 
for the general tendency in the community, and focus on changes following the loans.  
When the informants were asked about portable water in the household, it meant 
whether they have installed their own source of portable water or not. In addition, if a 
household has got access to a basic service whitin a community, by definition, the 
community has got access to it as well.  
In this section it is important to note that the percentages and conclusions are based 
primarily on the answers of the informants in Cipres. I did not have a control group of 
non-members that have received credit or official statistics on access to basic services 
in the different communities. Table 6-4.1 gives the percentage values of access to 
basic services among the informants and how it has changed: 
 1 2 3 4 
Basic service 
HOUSEHOLD Before credit After credit % change t-value 
Portable water 44.4 63.9 43.9 2.497 
Electricity/lights 72.2 83.3 15.4 1.673 
Conventional phone 8.3 13.8 66.3 1.00 
Cell phone 36.1 75 107.7 4.249 
Television 66.7 91.7 37.5 3.416 
Basic service 
COMMUNITY Before credit After credit % change t-value 
Portable water 64.9 72.2 11.2 1.357 
Electricity/lights 75 91.7 22.3 2.646 
Conventional phone 25 44.4 77.6 2.907 
Cell phone 52.8 88.9 68.4 4.448 
Television 77.8 97.2 24.9 2.907 
 
Table 6-4.1: Access to basic services before and after recieving credit, 
 household and community level 
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Household level, before and after receiving credit 
We see from column (1) that before receiving credit, the informants had some level 
of basic services. Access to electricity and television stands out as two services that 
many were in possession of, while the level of conventional phones in the household 
was low. A possible explanation for this can be the poor telephone infrastructure on 
the Nicaraguan countryside, as well as the initial costs of installing it in the 
household.  
In column (2), we see that all the numbers are higher than in the corresponding 
percentage in column (1). What is puzzling, however, is that there is a higher 
percentage level on television than electricity/lights. Normally, you would need 
access to electricity to have a television. The reason for getting this result can be 
misunderstanding of the question, for example by only answering ”yes” on the 
question concerning electricity if they have lights (lamps) in the house. Some do 
however have a television but no lamps. Another explanation can be battery-driven 
televisions, or that they connect to the neighbours’ access to electricity to watch 
television. We see that almost 92% of the informants have got a television, which is a 
very high number, taking into account that they are small to medium-sized farmers 
with low incomes. 
Column (3) shows the percentage change between (1) and (2). We see that in all 
cases, the percentage change is positive. The largest percentage rise is for cell phones, 
with 107%. The reason can be that it becomes more easily obtainable for poor people 
to own a cell phone, because of low prices and telephone companies who are 
reaching further and further into the rural areas. It also involves low initial costs, and 
with a prepay phone card, it is easy to manage and adjust the costs in using it. The 
change in access to conventional phones has also got a high percentage increase, but 
is still at a low level.  
By looking at the t-values in column (4), it can be seen that the changes in access to 
portable water, cell phone and television are statistically significant. Cell phone 
stands out with the strongest result, with a t-value of 4.249. Conventional phone and 
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electrciy/lights are not statistically significant. Electricity/lights however lies just 
below 1.64, which is the limit for being significant at the 90% significance level.  
Community level, before and after receiving credit 
On the community level, the access to basic services is quite high. We see that access 
to cell phones has increased substantially, with 52.8% of the communities having 
access to it before, and 88.9% after. The change in access to cell phones has a t-value 
of 4.448, which means that the change is statistically significant. By looking at the t-
values, we see that we see that the change is statistically significant for all factors, 
exept for portable water, which has only experienced an 11.1% increase. 
When looking at the community level, we do not know the reasons for the changes. 
Cipres does not have any community programs, and we cannot conclude that offering 
credit to households within a community will increase the social development of the 
entire community. What can be said however, is that there has been a general positive 
trend in access to basic services in the communities, and use this as background 
information when considering the changes in the households´ access to basic services.  
Community versus Household level, before and after receiving credit 
From Table 6-4.1 it is obvious that in all cases, there are higher levels of access to 
basic services on the community level than the household level. This is not a surprise, 
as the inteviews are done in rural areas with high poverty rates and inequality among 
the population. By looking at the table it is also obvious that the informants have 
better access to basic services than the poorest part of the population, which shows 
that they have a certain level of development also before they receive credit. Whether 
this influences the effect of recieving micro-credit, is not treated in this thesis. 
Table 6-4.2 shows how the difference between access to basic services in the 
household versus the community, have changed.  
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 5 6 7 
Basic service 
BEFORE 
% difference  
(Household- Community) 
AFTER 
% difference 
(Household- Community) 
Difference, 
%-points 
(5)- (6) 
Portable water -20.5 -8.3 -12.2 
Electricity/lights -2.8 -8.4 5.5 
Conventional phone -16.7 -30.6 13.9 
Cell phone -16.7 -13.9 -2.8 
Television -11.1 -5.5 5.5 
 
Table 6-4.2 Difference between access to basic services,  
household versus community, before and after receiving credit. 
Column (5) shows the situation before recieving credit. From the first row it is 
apparent that 20.5% of households within communities where at least one household 
had access to portable water, did not have the same access in their own home. When 
looking at the numbers for electricity, we see that almost all the informants living in 
communities with access to electricity also had access in their own home. The smaller 
the difference is, the more equal is the development level in the community and the 
household. The difference must by definition be negative in column (5) and (6), 
because the household cannot have access to a basic service without there being 
access in the community. Column (6) shows the same as (5), but after recieving 
credit. Column (7) shows the percentage point change between (5) and (6). A 
negative number means that the change in access has been larger for the households 
than the community, which gives an indication that the changes actually comes from 
receiving credit, and not because of a general development on the Nicaraguan 
countryside. A positive number means that some communities have gotten access to a 
service, without the household having the same access in his home.  
The table shows that for access to portable water and cell phone the difference has 
gone down, while for electricity, conventional phones and television it has gone up. It 
can be interpreted in the way that people prioritize portable water and cell phones, but 
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this conclusion is somehow weak, as electricity and television are basic services that 
many have access to both before and after receiving credit. 
General conclusion 
As a general conclusion, one can say that by looking separately at the household and 
the community level before and after receiving credit, there has been a substantial 
increase in the access to basic services. Especially cell phones stands out as a basic 
service with a large increase both on the household and community level. When 
considering the difference between the change in the household and the community, 
the difference becomes smaller for cell phones and portable water, while there are 
more communities that have gotten access to conventional phone, television and 
electricity/lights, without the households getting the same access. 
6.5 Modifications 
It is necessary to include some remarks on the result. There can be factors other than 
the credit that can have influenced these development factors, such as a general rise 
in the development level and technological progress. Nicaragua has had an annual 
GDP growth of 3.2% since 2001, and a reduction in extreme poverty from 17 % in 
1998 to 15 % in 2005 (World Bank 2009). 
In addition, during June and July 2008 the world market food prices peaked together 
with record high petroleum prices (E24 2008). These are external factors that have an 
impact on the economy of the peasants in Nicaragua through higher production and 
consumption costs. Even though higher food prices give a higher income when their 
production is sold, many live on subsistence level, and do not produce enough to 
cover the additional costs on other products. The impact will differ from region to 
region and family-to-family, according to the level of dependence of transportation 
and other petroleum costs, a well as the level of consumption over production. Some 
areas in Nicarargua have experienced a growth in the economy because of suitable 
weather conditions and a high world demand, while other areas suffer from these 
changes. The North- Eastern region of the country is severly affected by the climate 
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change, and this has a large effect on the production and the predictability of 
production and income of the population (mostly farmers) living in the area (OXFAM 
International 2009). Cipres does not have any cooperatives there. 
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7. Micro-Credit; A Theoretical Approach 
This section is dedicated to a theoretical understanding of some of the problems that 
MFIs encounter when offering micro-credit to farmers in rural areas and how these 
problems can be resolved. It is based on problems that comply specificly with Cipres. 
Moral hazard and adverse selection problems arise as a consequence of asymmetric 
information between the lending institution and the borrower. Monitoring in 
cooperatives can however be one way of coping with these types of problems. 
Another problem is the threat of borrowers going to other MFIs, and where the 
lending institution ends up losing his client. This can be solved by what is called 
progressive lending.  
At the end of the chapter, risk in agricultural production is explained, and a simple 
model of insurance through flexible repayment conditions is presented.   
7.1 Asymmetric Information 
7.1.1 Moral Hazard  
Moral hazard is what is known as incomplete information about the decisions and 
choices made by the borrower (Bardhan and Udry 1999: 81). The borrower decides 
how much work effort he puts into production, and as the size of the crop depends on 
his effort, the lender is unable to predict his income. The borrower can therefore state 
a high value of production in his loan application, to be able to obtain more credit. 
That creates a problem for the lender, because many borrowers will then end up not 
being able to repay their debts. The higher the asymmetry level of information is, the 
lower is the probability of repayment (Lanuza 2004).  
Let us assume that the credit recipients or the farmers in this case, can choose 
between a low and a high effort in production. A low effort will give a low expected 
production, and a high effort will give a high expected production. It can be written 
as , where  is expected utility of production, and  denotes 
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production in case of high or low effort level, . When signing a credit contract, 
the lender has to consider how much income it is reasonable to expect that the 
borrower will obtain, and thereafter decide how much he can borrow. The problem 
arises when there is a ”worst” case and a ”best” case of the income level, which 
depends on the behaviour of the farmer. The lender can only make a contract on the 
”best” case income if he is certain that the farmer will obtain this production level. He 
must therefore make the loan conditions in such a way that it is also in the interest of 
the farmer to give a high effort level (Bardhan and Udry 1999). 
7.1.2 Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection and heterogeneous clients will also create problems in credit 
markets. Each individual is different, and the lender needs to take that into account 
when considering the loan application and the lending conditions. In a situation with 
asymmetric information, the lender does not have sufficient information to be able to 
make a contract that is specific to each borrower’s character. Adverse selection can 
also be a situation where the borrower has information about his soil, which 
influences the probability that he will obtain a certain production level.  
Let us assume that there are two farmers, Farmer 1 and Farmer 2, who own the same 
amounts of land. Farmer 1 makes reasonable business decisions, where he takes all 
necessary considerations before the season starts. He ends up with a high production 
that we call . Farmer 2 does not make the right considerations before the season 
starts, eg. he begins planning too late, makes bad investment decisions or puts the 
seeds in the ground later than what he should have done. This results in a low 
production, , where . The lender does not have information about who the 
two different types of farmers are, so when he makes the contract, it is either based on 
a belief that they both behave in the same way, or he does not know which borrower 
has which characteristic, and makes a random guess. If the lender makes a contract 
and offers credit, , according to some standard function of the amount of land (T), 
, he will offer equal amounts of credit to both farmers. Farmer 2 will then 
receive more than what he would have gotten if the lender knew his characteristics. 
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This can result in a loan where Farmer 2 is not able to repay, and the lender ends up 
losing the credit. 
7.1.3 Monitoring in Cooperatives. 
Close social ties between the borrower and the co-signer are essential 
in order to reduce the default risk (Bauer 2004).  
To meet the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, the lending institutions 
needs to seek a way of ensuring that their members are honest and trustworthy in 
their repayment and loan application. They also want to make sure that they make 
good investment decisions. A traditional investigation of each client will lead to high 
monitoring costs per loan, because of the small lending amounts.  
A solution is to organize their members in credit cooperatives, agricultural 
cooperatives or joint-liability credit groups, where the members monitor each other 
within the group. By organizing in cooperatives, the lending insitution can take 
advantage of the fact that their members meet on a regular basis and know each other 
well. In this way, members who do not behave appropriately or according to their 
agreements will risk social sanctions and exclusion from the other group members. It 
will therefore create incentives for good behaviour, repayment and trustable 
information in the loan applications. It is also apparent that the smaller the groups are, 
the more efficient is the monitoring (Huppi and Feder 1990). In Cipres, the larger 
cooperatives have stricter lending conditions and collateral requirements than the 
smaller cooperatives, because perfect monitoring becomes more difficult to obtain if 
the cooperatives are large. 
The cooperatives also have a risk pooling function. By giving the members the 
responsibility of managing the cooperative, they can share the credit risk among 
themselves. If some do not repay their loans, the whole cooperative will jointly suffer 
from the consequences, through a lower pool of credit and/or other services. It can 
also result in stricter lending conditions. When considering new entrants into the 
cooperative, they will therefore only accept people they trust, to become members of 
the cooperative (ibid). 
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Small joint-liability credit groups of four to six people are not commonly used in 
Nicaragua and Latin- America (Bauer 2004, Lanuza 2004), and this is neither the 
case for Cipres. Hence, I will neglect this aspect of micro-credit here. 
7.2 Progressive Lending 
One important aspect of micro-credit is that it often includes a long-term relationship 
between the lender and the borrower, and includes more than one loan. Of my 
selection of interview objects, they had borrowed between one and twenty times over 
a period of up to ten years. 
Progressive lending is also an aspect that creates incentives of repayment. It means 
that the size of the loan increases with the number of loans and successful 
repayments. Because the borrower will have an opportunity of increasing the loans in 
future periods, it creates an incentive to behave well in earlier periods (Stiglitz and 
Weiss 1980). This can also be seen as a threat of restrictions on future credit. If one 
fails to repay the loan in one period, he can be faced with punishment from the 
lender, either by facing a higher interest rate on the next loan, being banned for some 
period, not being able to lend as much the next time or facing a higher collateral 
demand.  
The first loan is usually low, because of the problem with credit constraints of the 
borrower. He often lacks what is needed to obtain credit in traditional commercial 
banks, and this in itself can create incentives of repayment, because of few outside 
options. 
In Nicaragua they have a national system where information about all unpayed 
traditional loans is listed. If someone becomes “black listed” in this system, it will be 
difficult for them to receive credit elsewhere. Cipres is not a part of this system, and 
therefore needs to use other mechanisms to ensure repayment and long-term 
commitment. By demanding collateral, they can cope with this type of problem, but 
because of the varying degree of the use and value of collateral among the 
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cooperatives, it is also preferable to include other mechanisms, such as progressive 
lending. 
7.2.1 The Dynamics of Progressive Lending 
de Aghion and Morduch (2005:123-124) presents a simple model to show how the 
dynamics of progressive lending work. They assume a borrower in a two period game 
that initiates production after receiving credit, at a cost, . It is assumed that he 
cannot produce anything without receiving credit. The value of the investment at the 
end of the period will have risen to some level higher than the initial cost, . If the 
borrower is only going to produce in one period, there exists no incentive for him to 
repay his debt at this point, because he loses nothing. If the lender has an arrangement 
where the possibility of borrowing in the second period is dependent on a successful 
repayment in the first period, the borrower faces the choice between not repaying 
today and thereby not receiving credit in the future, or repaying today and getting 
access to credit in the second period. The same lack of incentives for repayments also 
compounds to the second period however, because in a two-period situation, the 
game ends there. It is assumed a discount factor, , on the value of credit because 
people are generally more interested in the value they have in the present than in the 
future. It is also assumed a probability, , of receiving a new loan in the second 
period even though the repayments are not done in the first period. If the borrower 
does not repay his loan in the first period, his total expected return is . If he 
decides to repay in the first period, he will obtain an expected return of , 
where R is the gross repayment including interest rates. The  is neglected because if 
he repays in the first period, he will for sure receive a loan in the next period. To 
make it interesting for the borrower to repay the loan in the first period, his total 
expected return with repayment must be at least as high as the total expected value 
without repayment in the first period, . In a definite game with two 
periods, the problem ends with an equilibrium solution where the borrower repays in 
the first period if the loan is high enough, but does not repay in the second. By 
extending the amount of periods to an indefinate game, however, the credit institution 
 48 
can assure repayments in all periods if he offers to increase the lending amounts in 
the future in such a way that it will always increase the expected value.  
7.3 Risk and Insurance 
7.3.1 Risk in Agricultural Production 
Farmers, especially in poor, rural areas in developing countries, are in a delicate 
position where they are extremely vulnerable to shocks. The uncertainity in 
agricultural decision-making is complex and must be treated in a full farm context. 
The different risk aspects can be devided into groups. Production risk includes all 
types of risk that directly influence the size of the crop or the livestock. Examples are 
weather conditions or animal and plant disease. Price or market risk, include 
transport and petroleum-related prices, food prices and world supply and demand for 
agricultural products. Institutional risk includes political risk and the type of 
government policy. That can affect export and import restricions of commodities that 
the farmers sell as well as access to intermediate goods needed for production. It can 
also affect tax and subsidy levels and credit arrangements offered by the government. 
Relationship risk includes the risk of the breaking of contracts by business partners. 
Human or personal risk concerns the farmers themselves, such as illness and death, 
or maltreatment of animals. Financial risk involves credit and interest rate risk. This 
only occurs if at least a part of the production is financed through borrowed capital 
(Hardaker et.al 2004:7). 
In agriculture, the probabilities of extreme outcomes, both in a positive or a negative 
direction can be large, especially in areas suffering from extreme weather variations. 
Nicaragua lies in the Mexico gulf, a part of the world that is severly affected by the 
climate change. Every rainy season between June and October the number of tropical 
storms combined with draughts involves huge fluctuations in the income of the 
farmers, and therefore also difficult to predict their income.  
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Fluctuating weather conditions makes it difficult for the farmer to ensure a crop close 
to the expected level. Over time, the average crop will also tend to be lower than the 
expected level. This is because the devastations from severe disasters are seldom 
compensated by the same value of positive ”surprises” (Hardaker et.al 2004: 11). 
Problems like these can occur if the farmers or the credit institutions operate with the 
level of production in “good” years without extreme weather, as the expected 
production level. 
Risk averse consumers and expected utility 
A risk averse farmer or agent has a utility of expected wealth  higher than the 
expected utility of wealth, . As his wealth increases, he seeks to 
minimize his risk by chosing the safer alternative. This means that his utility funtion 
has a positive, but concave shape (Varian 2003:225). 
If a situation has more than one possible outsomes, and there is a given probability of 
both outcomes, it is common in credit market theory to use expected utility as a 
measure of the utility of wealth of the consumer (LeRoy and Werner 2001, Sandvik 
2003). Hardaker and Lien (2005) explains expected utility as an average, weigthed by 
the probabilities of the utility of the different outcomes, , 
where p is the probability measure, . 
With a von Neuman-Morgenstern expected utility, the probabilities are known.  
7.3.2 Insurance 
To cope with risk and problems of fluctuating and unsecure income levels, the 
farmers need to insure in some way.  
With access to financial services, this can be done through buying a microinsurance 
against bad crops or death and health insurance (de Aghion and Morduch 2005). A 
type of insurance that is gaining growing interest is insurance against extreme 
weather (Morduch (2002), World Bank (2007)) However, none of these are offered 
by Cipres, and will not be treated further.  
 50 
Farmers can also self-insure through their production and savings decisions, or the 
credit institution can indirectly insure their clients through particular lending 
conditions. A model below will further describe how Cipres offers this type of 
insurance. 
Self- insurance 
Farmers often engage in what is called self-insurance. One example is through 
savings. The farmers can for example save money or a part of the production. If they 
are met by increased or unanticipated expences, they can sell the production and 
spend the money. Another way of saving is through investments in livestock. If they 
buy a calf at a certain price one year, it will become more valuable as it grows bigger, 
and can be sold at a higher price later. A problem with the last two types of saving is 
the market risk. The prices can be fluctuating, and if these drop substantially, the 
farmers can end up losing on their investment. Livestock is more often used as a 
long-term saving, because it takes some time before the animals grow large. It is also 
something that many keep in addition to other types of savings, because it is used for 
practical purposes in production, and will therefore only be sold if it is absolutely 
necessary. 
When it comes to self- insuring the crop, some preparations can be done to cope with 
risk both before and after the harvest season, ex- ante and ex-post. Ex-ante factors can 
be diversification of production or income- generating activities. Product 
diversification means that if one type of plant is more resistant to heavy rains and 
other plants more resistant to draughts, the farmer will through differentiation 
securing his production at a minimum level in either case. Diversification of income- 
generating activities can be to engage in off-farm work, or having a buffer saving. Ex-
post activites are done after a crisis has occurred, and can include insurance, savings, 
selling livestock or other valuable farm assets, or lending from family or friends 
(Bardhan and Udry 1999: 94-95). A problem with the community based insurance 
through lending and borrowing is that the whole community is often affected at the 
same time. 
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7.3.3 A Model of Indirect Insurance Through Flexible Repayment 
Conditions 
This model aims to explain more thoroughly how Cipres offers their members a type 
of insurance through flexible repayment arrangements. For Cipres such insurance will 
induce higher risk of repayments, but by offering better credit conditions than other 
micro-credit institutions, it will contribute to securing a long-term commitment of 
their members. According to the informants, the flexible repayment arrangement is 
one of the main reasons why they chose to receive credit from Cipres and not any 
other credit institution. All micro-credit institutions are neither capable of offering 
this type of insurance, because it requires good knowledge of agricultural production 
as well as closeness to and monitoring of their members and the climatic situation in 
the area. 
The base case scenario shows the behaviour and demand for credit for a risk averse 
farmer. The next looks at how the farmer adjusts in a situation where he faces a 
probability of degradation of the land, and Cipres offers to postpone repayments. 
After that follows a section on how the amount of credit and insurance is affected if 
the farmers become more vulnerable to climatic volatility.    
Base Case 
Let us assume that the happiness of the farmers can be explained by utility. In a very 
simplified form, we can say that utility depends on the size of the harvest, H, the size 
of the credit, K, and the price of credit, namely the interest rate, i. For now, I assume 
that the interest rate is constant. The utility is assumed to look like the following: 
  
U = U H,K,i( ) = 11− µ H − iK( )
1−µ( )                (1)  
Let us assume that the farmers are risk averse, and have a constant relative risk 
aversion. This means that the form of the marginal utility function can be written 
. 
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Utility of the farmer has a positive relationship to the size of the harvest. The farmer 
will however not be in favour of raising the level of the harvest infinetely, so there is 
a positive relationship between U and H, but to a decreasing degree. The interest rate 
has a negative relationship with utility, because if it increases, the cost of receiving a 
loan goes up. The level of credit is what we will investigate further. 
I assume that the level of the harvest is dependent on the amount of credit and the 
amount of land, T (terrain). Credit will improve the harvest through investments in 
fertilizers, good quality seeds, and equipment necessary to utilize the soil better. The 
amount of land is positive with regards to the harvest size, as one cannot produce 
anything without land. How much land the farmer has, is considered to be constant 
and exogenously given. The expression of harvest will hence be a function of credit 
and land: 
               (2) 
Both factors will marginally raise the harvest, but to a declining degree;  
and .  I also assume that production cannot be zero, meaning 
that . Inserting this into (1) yields: 
  
U = 11− µ F(K,T) − iK[ ]
1−µ( )           (1`) 
As a base case I want to see how an increase in credit affects the utility level of the 
farmer, in a situation where there are no constraints on credit. I do this by finding the 
partial derivative of utility with respect to credit. The first order condition will be 
  
∂U
∂K = F(K) − iK[ ]
−µ( ) F ′ − i( ) = 0    (3) 
In an optimal allocation, the farmer will adjust such that his marginal production is 
equal to marginal cost, . This is where the first order condition will be equal to 
zero.  reflects the marginal change of utility if credit increases. It is positive, which 
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indicates that because of increased production it will always be positive for the 
farmer to receive more credit, as long as the net benefit is at least zero. 
Insurance in Case of Degradation 
I will now look at a situation where the credit institution, here Cipres, offers a type of 
insurance on credit. They have a special repayment arrangement, where the farmers 
can postpone their repayment if they have gotten a low harvest and are unable to pay 
their debt at the scheduled date. If this happends, Cipres will call in to a meeting with 
the affected farmer, where he can explain himself. Then they will make a new 
repayment schedule. How strict Cipres behaves, vary from region to region, but here I 
will only consider a short run case, where the farmer does not lose anything if there is 
a bad harvest. I will look away from the moral hazard aspect where p is endogenously 
given by the effort of the farmer, and assume that every farmer does his best. This is 
because Cipres do generally not have any problems with repayment. They have a 
follow-up on all loans, and all credit applicants are expected to make detailed 
investment plans that must be accepted by Cipres before they recieve their credit.  
I assume that the harvest has two possible outcomes: degradation or no degradation 
of the crop.  is the probability of degradation, and  is the corresponding 
probability of no degradation.  is exogenously given, and includes the probability of 
extreme weather conditions, illness of plants or farmers or other random factors that 
influence the harvest.  
In case of no degradation, I assume that the farmers get a utility like the expression in 
(1), marked with an  for no degradation. This is a situation where the farmers get a 
good harvest. In case of degradation, I assume that the farmers get a low harvest, 
marked with a  for degradation.  is a constant, which measures the productivity of 
each state, . I assume that . 
An expression of expected utility will then be given as: 
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I insert for the utility in case of degradation and no degradation: 
  
EU = p 11− µ θdF K( ) − idK[ ]
1−µ( )⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
+ 1− p( ) 11− µ θnF K( ) − inK[ ]
1−µ( )⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
 
I assume that in case of no degradation,  in case of degradation. Because 
Cipres can offer to expand the repayment plan if something happends to the harvest, I 
assume that the interest rate in case of degradation is zero, . This means that in 
the short run they will not have to repay their loan, so  is dropped: 
  
EU = p 11− µ θdF K( )[ ]
1−µ( )⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
+ 1− p( ) 11− µ θnF K( ) − inK[ ]
1−µ( )⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
   (4) 
Maximizing EU with respect to credit gives the maximizing problem: 
  
MaxEUK = p
1
1− µ θdF K( )[ ]
1−µ( )⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
+ 1− p( ) 11− µ θnF − inK[ ]
1−µ( )⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
 
  
∂EU
∂K = p θdF[ ]
−µ( )θd F ′ + 1− p( ) θnF − inK[ ] −µ( ) θnF ′ − in( ) = 0    (5) 
  
p
(1− p) = −
θnF − inK[ ] −µ( )
θdF[ ] −µ( )
θnF ′ − in( )
θnF ′
 
  
p
(1− p) = −
xn
xd
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
−µ( ) (θnF ′ − in )
θd F ′
(6) 
 is the relative probability of degradation. It will always be positive, because p is 
between zero and one.  The term 
  
xn
xd
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
−µ( )
measures the relative production.  
is the relative marginal production. Because of the negative sign on the right side of 
(6), it requires that . This means that when the farmer is maximizing expected 
utility with respect to credit, he will end up at a lower credit level than in the base 
case, where we ignored the probability of the different outcomes. 
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From (4), we see that in case of an increased p, the probability weighted expected 
production level in bad times, will go up, if all other factors are kept constant. But 
since the production levels in each case are different, , the total expected 
utiliy, , will decline. A necessary condition is that the difference between  and 
 is large enough to outweigh the change in . I assume that this is the case, 
because otherwise there would not be any incentives to offer or recieve credit. 
Increased Probability of Extreme Weather Conditions; 
Effects on the Level of Credit and Insurance 
Because Nicaragua lies in an area that is notably affected by the climate changes, I 
want to look at a situation where the probability of bad weather and degradation of 
the land, rises. How does this affect the credit and interest rate decisions of the 
lender? From (5) we have that 
  
∂EU
∂K = p θdF[ ]
−µ( )θd F ′ + (1− p) θnF − inK[ ] −µ( ) (θnF ′ − in ) = 0 
I use this to consider a marginal rise in , on the level of credit: 
    (7) 
Differentiating (5) with respect to a marginal rise in  yields 
  
EUKp = θdF[ ] −µ( )θd F ′ − θnF − inK[ ] −µ( ) (θnF ′ − in ) 
When considering the direction of the change in credit, we have to look at the size of 
. By definition, the total value of the denominator is positive because of the 
shape of U. If the change in marginal utility of production in case of degradation is 
smaller than in case of no degradation, 
  
θdF[ ] −µ( )θd F ′ < θnF − inK[ ] −µ( ) (θnF ′ − in )   
, the value of (7) will be negative. That implies a higher credit level. If 
, it implies a lower credit level. The optimal level of credit, , will hence 
be where the change in marginal utility of production in case of degradation is equal 
to the change in case of no degradation: 
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  
θdF[ ] −µ( )θd F ′ = θnF − inK[ ] −µ( ) (θnF ′ − in )     (8) 
Cipres´ role 
What can Cipres do in this situation? In this model, Cipres´ only decision variables 
are the credit and the interest rate. Above we get the result that the worse the effects 
of the climate changes are on the size of the crop, the less credit is optimal to offer. 
Since it is obvious that the climate changes in the Central American region is not a 
preferable situation for many of the farmers in the area, this implies that in the long-
run, Cipres will stop offering credit. That is not a sustainable micro-credit system. 
What Cipres can do, however, is to lower the interest rate. By lowering , the value 
of 
  
θdF[ ] −µ( )θd F ′ = θnF − inK[ ] −µ( ) (θnF ′ − in ) will have a higher value, and  increases.  
It is important to note that this is a very simplified answer, and that offering credit is 
not the only solution to the increased probability of degradation of land. In the real 
world, there are more than two possible scenarios, and Cipres can work with lowering 
the scope of devastations if a crisis incure, meaning to obtain a higher value on the 
left side of (8). This can be for example be done through diversification of production 
or investigation on seeds that are more persistent to extreme weather. By doing this, 
they contribute to minimizing the costs for the farmers if something has already 
occured, and thereby also increase the probability of repayment of the loans.  
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8. Conclusion 
This thesis has explained how an NGO in Nicaragua works with micro-credit, and 
investigated how this has influenced the credit recipients. It has looked at aspects that 
are specific to rural areas and showed that credit must be adjusted to the borrower in 
order to obtain a long-term sustainable relationship between the lender and the credit 
recipient.  
It has been seen that micro-credit has had a positive impact on the local social 
development among the members of Cipres, especially concerning income-related 
factors, social factors and saving. Access to basic services has also increased 
following the credit. The successfulness is influenced by the lending conditions and 
organization of Cipres, which motivates the credit recipients to stay in the 
organization over time. There have however not been a control group of farmers 
outside of Cipres, so the conclutions must be put into this specific context. 
Moral hazard and adverse selction problems arising from asymmetric information 
between the lender and the borrower, is solved by organizing the members of Cipres 
in cooperatives and taking advantage of the close relationship they have with each 
other. Cipres also offer progressive lending as a motivation to stay in the 
organization. The risk aspect of agricultural production is important in Nicaragua, 
and Cipres also consider this when arranging contracts. By offering flexible 
repayment arrangements, it will work as a type of income insurance in case of 
climatic difficulties. 
Overall, there is in the interest of the lender to offer lending conditions that motivates 
the borrower to be loyal. In the long run this will give both satisfied clients and 
lenders.     
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Attachment I 
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Attachment II 
         
Questions:   
1) Name   
2) Name of cooperative + central    
3) Age   
4) Gender   
5) Sivil status- Married/not married   
6) Occupation   
7) Number of children   
8) Number of children living with you   
9) Number of people in the household   
   
10) Source of income: Agriculture, Commerce, Livestock/Animals, Remittances, 
Other(what?), None 
11) How many earns an income in your household?  
12) What is your monthly income?   
13) What is the monthly income of the household?  
14) Are you able to predict your income; tomorrow, next week, next month, next year, 
no. 
15) After receiving the loan, your ability to predict you income is; Easier, The same, 
Worse 
 16) Do you receive remittances? From family members abroad, from Nicaragua, 
Other(specify)  
17) Range in order of priorities, how you spend your income; 
 Food, Clothes, Housing improvement, Schooling, Production/Inputs, Other(health, 
electricity, water etc) 
   
18) Do you save?   
19) Your possibilities of saving after receiving loans, are: Better, The same, Worse 
   
20) How many times have you received loans from Cipres? 
21) How much did you receive each time?   
22) What did each of your loans go to?   
23) Where you able to repay every loan according to the repayment plan? 
24) How long was the repayment time scheduled to?  
25) What was the monthly interest rate?   
   
26) Is your experience with credit what you expected it to be? Yes, No 
27) How did you get in contact with the financier?  
28) Do you consider your income to increase in the future, after investing the money? 
29) Did you receive teaching in how to invest your money?  
30) In what form?   
31) Have you received credit from another financial institution?  
Which one? How much? How many times? For what?  
32) Why did you want to borrow from Cipres?  
   
33) Do you know how to read? Write?   
34) Level of schooling?   
35) If you have children- how many of them go to school?  
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36) How many boys? How many girls?   
37) What is the level of schooling of each of you children?  
38) The school is; Public or Private?   
39) How much does is cost to send one child to school for one year? 
40) The possibilities of sending your children to school after receiving loans, are;  
Better, The same, Worse 
   
41) Have you got access to health care?   
42) Your access to health care, after receiving loans, are; Better, The same, Worse 
   
43) Have you been a member of a civil or political organization before recieving loans? 
44) Did you become a member in a new organization after recieving loans? 
   
45) Access to basic services; Portable water, Electric lights, Conventional telephone, 
Cell phone, Television 
i) before the loan; in the household   
ii) before the loan; in the community   
iii) after the loan; in the household   
iv) after the loan; in the community   
   
46)For agriculture: Did you have; Tractor, Desgranador(for corn), Recolector(for beans), 
Seeds, Fertilizers: 
i) before the loans?   
ii) after the loans?   
   
47) For commerce: Did you have your shop before recieving the loan? 
48) What did you improve after recieving the loans?  
   
49) Before receiving loans, your house, farm or the place you live, where;  
Rented, Your own property, Owned by a familiy member, Other(specify) 
50) After receiving loans, your house, farm or the place you live, is;  
Rented, Your own property, Owned by a familiy member, Other(specify) 
   
51) Your quality of live with the credit is; Better, The same, Worse 
 
 
 
